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THE DARKLING LIGHTS OF
LUCIFER: ANNIHILATION,
TRADITION, AND HELL
Ross McCullough

I am ever tending toward nothing.
—The Imitation of Christ, III.40

Gregory of Nyssa is famous for defending both the doctrine of epektasis, the continual ascent of the blessed tow ard God, and, in places, the
doctrine of apokatastasis, the eventual restoration to God of all creation,
including the Devil. This is a curious conjunction, for while Gregory connects them more than adventitiously, the tradition of the Eastern Church
has largely received the former and rejected the latter.1 The point of this
essay is to follow that intuition, not to say inspiration, of the tradition:
briefly to challenge Gregory's conjunction and to develop from that challenge and w ith certain currents in philosophy of religion a conception of
hell that is consistent w ith epektasis, avoids the implications of apokatastasis, and is itself attractive—which is to say, appropriately repulsive.
This will not be an attem pt to reconcile epektasis w ith W estern eschatology. The best such effort may be present, incipiently, in Maximus the
Confessor's impossible "moving rest,"2 itself a synthesis of the dynamic
suggestions of Gregory w ith the static and sabbatical emphasis of the late
Platonists, the early Origenists, and the Latins. This will also by its nature
be closer to w hat philosophers call a "theodicy" than to w hat they call
a "defense": more a plausible attem pt at filling out the truth—here not
the w hy but the w hat of hell—than a dem onstration of certain doctrines'
Ross McCullough, Yale University, Department of Religious Studies, PO Box
208287, New Haven, CT 06520-8287. E-mail: ross.mccullough@yale.edu
1. Epektasis continues to appear up through Palamas (see, for instance, Triads, II.3.35),
whereas apokatastasis largely falls out of favor w ith the sixth-century condem nations of
Origenism.
2. See, e.g., Amb. 67, Q. Thai. 59, 65.
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logical coherence. I care to describe hell, darkly and in part, not to defend
the mere compatibility of some two of its attributes. Here also Maximus
gives the keynote: "It is not a m atter of refuting the opinions of others,
but of presenting one's own; not a m atter of contesting some aspect of the
teaching or behavior of others that seems not to be good but of writing on
behalf of the truth."3

EPEKTASIS AND APO K ATASTASIS

A lthough the doctrine of epektasis has antecedents in the ante-Nicene
Fathers and in the other Cappadocians,4 it receives its m ost articulate
treatm ent in Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory bases the idea of perpetual
progress on the principle that the desire for God is never satisfied, expanding even as it is fulfilled. He w rites of the follower of God: "He is
still unsatisfied in his desire for more. He still thirsts for that w ith which
he constantly filled himself to capacity, and he asks to attain as if he had
never partaken, beseeching God to appear to him, not according to his
capacity to partake, but according to G od's true being."5 Passages like
this ring w ith G regory's ow n spiritual experience, but the idea is in his
philosophical as well as his spiritual-ascetic w orks.6 In Against Eunomius, for instance, it is grounded in G regory's m ore general philosophical claims about creation's dependence upon God:
For to the Godhead it properly belongs to lack no conceivable thing which
is regarded as good, w hile the creation attains excellence by partaking in
som ething better than itself; and further, not only had a beginning of its
being, but also is found to be constantly in a state of beginning to be in
excellence, by its continual advance in improvement, since it never halts at
what it has reached, but all that it has acquired becom es by participation
a beginning of its ascent to som ething still greater, and it never ceases, in
Paul's phrase, "reaching forth to the things that are before, and forgetting
the things that are behind" (Phil 3:13)7

3. In Epistulam Dionysii 6, quoted in H ans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe according to Maximus the Confessor, trans. Brian D aley (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
2003), 60.
4. See Everett Ferguson, "God's Infinity and Man's Mutability: Perpetual Progress according to Gregory of Nyssa," Greek Orthodox Theological Review 17, nos. 1-2 (1973): 60-61.
5. Gregory of N yssa, The Life of Moses, translated by Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett
Ferguson (N ew York: Paulist Press, 1978), 114 [par. 230],
6. For a brief analysis of the scholarship on the place and m otivations of epektasis in
Gregory and its relationship to his spiritual doctrine, philosophical theology, and criticism
of Origenism, see Paul M. Blowers, "Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the
Concept of 'Perpetual Progress,"' Vigiliae Christianae 46, no. 2 (1992): 151-53.
7. Against Eunomius, VIII, NPNF V, 210.
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The ascent is perpetual because its object is infinite:
The First Good is in its nature infinite, and so it follow s of necessity that
the participation in the enjoyment of it w ill be infinite also, for more w ill
be always being grasped, and yet som ething beyond that w hich has been
grasped w ill alw ays be discovered, and this search w ill never overtake its
Object, because its fund is as inexhaustible as the growth of that which
participates in it is ceaseless.8

For our growth to be ceaseless, it is not enough that our object be infinite;
our capacity to receive it m ust be capable of indefinite expansion. This, too,
Gregory asserts: "Such are the wonders that the participation in the Divine
blessings works: it makes him into whom they come larger and more capacious; from his capacity to receive it gets for the receiver an actual increase
in bulk as well, and he never stops enlarging."9 Or more briefly, "Activity
directed toward virtue causes its capacity to grow through exertion."10
This ability endlessly to pursue the good, grounded in the infinity of
God and therefore goodness, is m atched by an inability endlessly to pursue evil in its finitude.
N o w that which is always in motion, if its progress be to good, w ill never
cease m oving onwards to what lies before it, by reason of the infinity
of the course to be traversed:—for it w ill not find any limit of its object
such that w hen it has apprehended it, it w ill at last cease its motion: but
if its bias be in the opposite direction, w hen it has finished the course of
wickedness and reached the extreme limit of evil, then that w hich is ever
m oving, finding no halting point for its im pulse natural to itself w hen it
has run through the lengths that can be run in wickedness, of necessity
turns its m otion towards good: for as evil does not extend to infinity, but is
comprehended by necessary limits, it w ould appear that good once more
follow s in succession upon the limit of evil; and thus, as w e have said, the
ever-m oving character of our nature com es to run its course at the last
once more back towards good.11

Good is infinite and can be enjoyed forever; evil, bounded by good,
can be indulged only so far before being exhausted. Here we see the
connection betw een epektasis and apokatastasis: w hat makes perpetual
progress possible, the limitlessness of good, is also that which by limiting
evil determines the outcome of the peregrinations of the lost. W ander in
wickedness long enough and you will reach its end, which can only give
out upon the good.12 Elsewhere Gregory suggests an anthropological
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Against Eunomius, I, NPNF V, 62.
On the Soul and the Resurrection, NPNF V, 453.
Life of Moses, 113 [par. 226],
On the Making of Man 21:2, NPNF V, 410f.
See Jean D anielou, L'etre et le temps chez Grégoire de Nys se (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 196-97.
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basis for this limit to the pursuit of evil: "The desire for anything harmful is transitory and insubstantial. It is alien to m an right from the start,
w hereas that [good] alone w ith which we are familiar and are on intimate
term s is both desirable and agreeable."13 Evil desire is unnatural desire,
and unstable: no wickedness can become perpetual because we sooner or
later come to our senses. This is matched by the stability of the natural desire for God that grounds perpetual progress, from whose good sense we
never defect: "The heart flies upw ard through its stability in the good."14
Thus apokatastasis complements epektasis metaphysically, due to evil's
finitude and good's infinity, and anthropologically, as the instability of
natural desires yields to the stability of the pursuit of God.

THE UNMAKING OF MAN
I do not m ean to synthesize these anthropological and metaphysical accounts but to w ork from a weakness they share. For while Gregory defends the expansion of the capacities of those approaching God, he puts
less emphasis on the parallel condition of those receding from God: the
dim inution and corruption of the dam ned's capacities by sin. Apokatastasis is a possibility only if we retain sufficient intellectual and volitional
capacities at the end of our descent into evil to recommit ourselves to the
good.15 But this is by no means clear, especially if we work, as Gregory
does, w ith data from the spiritual life: while our experience of the good
shows that our "appetite is extended w ith the participation,"16our experience of evil reveals even more m arkedly an erosion of the very capacities
required to regain the right path. Gregory acknowledges this erosion,
of course,17 and it explains w hy the exploration of evil that precedes
apokatastasis consists not in the m aunderings of chance but in a descent
through "the course of wickedness" to "the extreme limit of evil."18 Each
step dow n the course confirms us ever more in our blindness and hard
13. Concerning Those Who Have Died, trans. Richard McCambly (accessible at h ttp ://
w w w .sa g e.ed u /fa c u lty /sa lo m d /n y ssa /), section J.57. For an analysis o f this account, see
Jerome Gaith, La conception de la liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 137-42.
14. Life of Moses, 118 [par. 244]. Some see Gregory's use of epektasis to be m otivated at
least in part by a desire to secure an eschatological stability that the Origenist system lacked.
See Blowers, "Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of 'Perpetual
Progress,"'152f.
15. Especially, for Gregory, a sense of shame. See Gaith, La conception de la liberté chez
Grégoire de Nysse, 139f.
16. On Ecclesiastes 2.
17. E.g., Concerning Those Who Have Died, J.57: "If w e freely debase ourselves through passion, w e w ill desire to do harm in the future."
18. On the Making of Man 21:2, NPNF V, 410. N ote that in other places Gregory suggests
that the evil are not so m uch m aking a single-m inded descent but seeking to ascend upon
shifting ground and so failing to make progress (e.g., Life of Moses, 243-44). Whether this is
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heartedness. But in appending apokatastasis to the descent, Gregory assumes that we reach the bottom of evil still free to return to the good. He
assumes, in brief, that we exhaust evil w ithout also exhausting ourselves.
But w hat if there is no dem onstration or Dante or deus ex machina to
open a door from the basem ent of hell into the vestibule of heaven? W hat
if persisting in perverse desires, however unstable, eventually prevents
our reversion to the more stable passions? W hat if the finitude of evil is
m easured not against the infinite good but against the finite evildoer, and
our descent kills us before it can save us? I suggested that one's m ind on
these issues is influenced by one's spiritual experience, and the difficulty
with the spiritual experience of the saints is that it may sometimes be too
felicitous to inspire this sense of an irreversibly evil course. Fortunately
there is the W estern Church, whose genius lies in producing saints intimately familiar w ith evil, and whose critics, though they m ight question
how far it sees into heaven, do not doubt it sees rather far into hell.
That sin could kill is a possibility held open by Paul Griffiths, who
works from an insight in the greatest of such W estern saints, though
indeed it is shared by m ost of the Fathers. Griffiths notes that for Augustine, sin is the dim inution by misuse of the soul's capacities, a dim inution
whose logical end is destruction. "Were a particular soul to become so
dam aged that it lost, irretrievably, freedom, the capacity to know, and
the capacity to form dispositions and act upon them, it would, simply,
cease, and w ith it w ould cease the hum an being of which it is a part."19
Augustine denies that it will quite come to that, refusing the conclusion
that we are finally annihilated either by our ow n hand or God's, but
his logic of participation suggests that such is the end of the way of the
wicked. "The fact that you are is sheer unm erited gift, and what you are is
a participant in God. Sin is the rejection of gift, and thereby the rejection
of participatory being. The result is loss of a properly ontological sort.
. . . This proliferative loss eats away at the soul, causing the progressive
loss of distinctive properties (freedom, choice, judgment, understanding,
virtuous habit, and so on) to the point where the soul returns to that from
which it came: nihil, nothing, the void, simple absence."20
Still, it is not clear that we can actually reach the point of nothingness. Even granting that sin erodes one's being by diminishing one's
essential capacities, w hy should we think that loss could be total and
those capacities could be destroyed?21 Perhaps we should not—it is hard
a separate class of sinners or an alternate description of the descent or sim ply an equivocation is not clear.
19. Paul Griffiths, "Self-Annihilation or Damnation? A Disputable Q uestion in Christian
Eschatology," in Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn, ed. Paul J. W eithman (Notre
Dame, IN: University of N otre Dam e Press, 2008), 89-90.
20. Griffiths, "Self-Annihilation or Damnation?" 92.
21. This case is m ade against Griffiths by Claire Brown and Jerry Walls, "Annihilationism: A Philosophical D ead End?" in The Problem of Hell: A Philosophical Anthology, ed. Joel
Buenting (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 47-53.
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to know how long a leash God gives us in these things without looking
to revelation, which will be discussed more below—but note that even
so we have enough to sever Gregory's connection betw een epektasis and
apokatastasis. The only way to descend w ithout annihilation is never fully
to exhaust those capacities whose exhaustion is a symptom of sin; it is
never fully to plum b the depths of evil, which w ould be destruction. Evil,
in Gregory's scheme, m ay still be limited, but then its exploration m ust
be acknowledged to sap progressively the energy of the explorer so that
she never reaches its limits. Sin corrupts both the force and the direction
of her will: confirmed ever more in her blindness, laboring ever more for
that which does not satisfy, she turns more and m ore to evil w ith less and
less effect.22 Dissolute, involute, her growing self-absorption is matched
only by a growing frailty. The accelerating progress of those in heaven,
whose possession spurs them on w ith greater capacity and greater desire,
is then matched not by a descent w ith a saving peripety but by an indefinite, decelerating inanition that never quite kills the damned, but never
can save them, either.23
This view, indeed, has m uch to recommend it. Epektasis is based on
Gregory's belief, disputed by some in the West, that our having-comeinto-being implies a changeableness in our nature that persists in heaven
as perpetual change for the good.24 But the scholastics had no problem
acknowledging mutability in the damned. Indeed, as Thomas says, the
dam ned are properly speaking still in time.25 Though he takes this to
m ean that they suffer a succession of punishm ents rather than what
Griffiths, reading Augustine, calls a "dim inution tow ard nonexistence,
the dying fall of a dim inuendo that will (or may) end in silence,"26 still
their basic tem porality w ould allow this sort of perpetual fall away from
God. That desire expands w hen fulfilled, which is the motive force of
epektasis, m ight be disputed by those W estern Christians who w ould see
in heaven our capacities entirely engaged and our desires entirely satisfied. But as Griffiths represents, no one in the Augustinian heritage—no
one w ith a doctrine of the Fall—w ould deny that the turn from God that
is consumm ated in hell involves not only disengaging our capacities but
22. "So [the mind] turns away from [God] and slithers and slides dow n into less and less,
w hich it im agines to be more and more." A ugustine, De Trinitate, 10.5.7.
23. In On Infants' Early Deaths (NPNF V, 378), Gregory m entions that Judas could experience eternal purgative chastisements. Whether this eternal purgative process m ight be effectively indistinguishable from an eternal destructive process is not clear, and as Gregory
does not explore h is suggestion in any w ay systematically, it is hard to know w hat to make
of it or its relation to apokatastasis.
24. See Ferguson, "God's Infinity and Man's Mutability," 68f.
25. "The fire of hell is called eternal only because it never ends. . . . In hell true eternity
does not exist, but rather time." ST 1.10.3 ad 2.
26. See Griffiths, "Self-Annihilation or Damnation?" 91.
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their real diminishment. Hell, like the sin which is its seed, is not just a
failure to look upon God but a loss of our very clear-sightedness; it is
both the misuse and the destruction of our freedom. It is ontological loss,
if not through continued postm ortem sin then through the progressive
actualization of that decisive break w ith God that happens at the Judgment. The dam ned have chosen, finally, for the idols, and out of respect
for their free choice, God allows them to become more and more like what
they have made.27
For those w ith the Aristotelian fever, who take their medicine in substance and accident, a useful parallel is Thom as's account of divinization.
For as in that great m ystery we participate accidentally in a form that
makes little sense unless understood (in some extended sense) at the level
of substance—Form, or the form of God—so here we are participating
accidentally and increasingly in the dissolution of substantial form. That
we never finally realize these substantial changes substantially, and that
the exact nature of their accidental application therefore remains unclear,
is as m uch a charge against the adequacy of the empyreal explanation
as against the infernal one. A nd the charge is just, for these are not very
clean explanations—but then our subject does not adm it of cleanliness. It
is clear that we can take on accidentally the essential properties of others,
as w ater takes on an essential property of fire when it is heated. A nd it
is clear that our essential properties can be expanded or occluded, if not
destroying us then at least rendering us unrecognizable, as gods or beasts.
But w hat exactly that looks like—w hether the dam ned are being frozen
into lifelessness like those in D ante's final circle or, like Tolkein's ring
wraiths, w ithering away from all that makes them m en w ithout thereby
forsaking their hum anity—is a subject that cannot be m uch explicated on
this side of the veil.
This is all to say that the picture of hell sketched here coheres with
broader Christian claims about ontology, mutability, and evil. But why
should this ontological loss be progressive? Why not a hell in which each
sinner is locked into that degree of attenuated being that she has chosen
for herself? There are two reasons a specifically progressive view is attractive: the second will be suggested below, after some remarks on temporality; the first has to do w ith general intuitions about justice.
Traditional views of hell and its eternity have long faced a proportionality objection: how is it just for God to punish finite sins w ith infinite
suffering? How is it just to set up an order in w hich the mistakes of a
27.
H ow this actualization is progressive is explored more below . N ote that though I have
framed this idea largely w ith hell as a natural consequence of sin, the sort of progressive
annihilation I sketch here could equally w ell be conceived in terms of G od's active punishm ent of sinners.
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short and nescient life result in limitless torment? The common traditional answer is that our continued defiance in hell justifies the continued
suffering it entails: the soul turned from God gets only w hat it deserves,
for every m om ent it deserves it, and this happens to endure forever.
The imm ediate rejoinder is that those in hell traditionally conceived
cannot turn back tow ard God, and it hardly seems just to be punished
for actions you can in no way avoid. Some indeed hold a m ild form of
escapism—defending the ability of the dam ned to leave hell, however
improbable—on precisely these grounds.28 But we need not go so far as
the escapists, for we can grant that the suffering of the dam ned is everlasting w ithout granting that it is infinite. In particular, if the dam ned are
forever diminishing, it is reasonable to think that their ability to suffer
diminishes as well. W hat Christ calls the destruction of both soul and body
in hell presum ably includes the destruction of those sensory faculties
that m ediate betw een the two, as it also includes the destruction of those
cognitive capacities that allow mere pain to be experienced as suffering.
As Dr. Johnson remarks, "He who makes a beast of himself gets rid of the
pain of being a man." While we m ay not always see sinners' physical faculties dim inish in this life, the spiritual observer will rem ark something
of their cognitive and volitional corruption,29 and the biblical account
of the Fall suggests that sin does indeed have physical consequences,
w ith hagiography suggesting as m uch of sanctity. Granted, then, that
our ability to suffer diminishes in hell, and that the am ount of suffering
diminishes correspondingly, it is entirely plausible that hell last forever
w ithout its torm ents exceeding a finite limit.30
28. See, e.g., Charles Seymour, A Theodicy of Hell (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000), 88-89. A
sort of apokatastasis could be sm uggled through the possibilities opened by escapism , though
Seymour notes the pow er of habit in confirming us in hell. So long as w e exist, God could
presumably give us the prevenient grace necessary to m ake our return to blessedness possible; one w ay to construe the tradition's disavow al of escapism is to hold that hell includes
the decisive rejection o f even this sort of grace, w hich w e are not given the ability to reject
decisively before the judgment. For the case that God w ou ld not rem ove this grace from us,
that the divine attributes suggest that escape w ill be m ade available even to those in hell,
see Andrei Buckareff and A llen Plug, "Escaping Hell: D ivine M otivation and the Problem
of Hell," Religious Studies 4: 39-54.
29. I am not m aking a public claim here; I am not saying the uncom m itted observer can
discover empirically the truth of this statement. Nor do I defend m y larger prem ise that
these capacities depend for their excellence on our right relationship w ith God, and for their
existence on a bare relationship w ith him, except to note that this is traditional.
30. By the mathematics of convergent series. James Cain defends the compatibility of suffering's infinite duration and finite overall sum by m eans of the theory of relativity, but his
suggestions are som ewhat bizarre and are meant only as a possible scenario show ing the
noncontradiction of the tw o ideas. See James Cain, "On the Problem of Hell," Religious Studies 38: 355-62. Cain dism isses the idea of a suffering of dim inishing intensity on the grounds
that it w ould eventually grow small enough to no longer be a barrier to overall happiness,
w hich is presum ably not allow ed to the dam ned. H e does not consider that the intensity of
the suffering m ight dim inish in a w ay that does not allow for its replacement by happiness,
as for instance by a dim inishm ent of our ability both to enjoy and to suffer.
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We m ight still w orry that the punishm ents of the dam ned are not
proportionate to the evils done in this life. The traditional view of hell
contains punishm ents of varied intensities, from m ere loss of beatitude
to serious torm ent, b u t if all are punished by a sort of progressive destruction, can we preserve this variegation? Indeed, w ouldn't those who
enter hell as worse sinners end up suffering less, since they are already
closer to death, as it were, w ith capacities for suffering already diminished? But this is to assum e a closer connection betw een torm ent and
ontological loss than necessarily obtains. O ne's dim inished capacities
may p u t an upw ard lim it on the am ount of torm ent one can experience
at any given time, bu t those w ith greater capacities for suffering need
not actually suffer more. The traditional poeni sensus, the pains of sense,
can be added or subtracted as justice requires from the poeni damni, the
pains of loss shared by all in hell. It is entirely possible that the espedally vicious are visited w ith an especially vicious destruction w hen
God destroys the destroyers o f the earth ; and conversely, it m ay even be
possible that some suffer their destruction w ithout torm ent, as those in
limbo are said to be separated from God w ithout any "pains of sense."
The difference I am suggesting lies not in the poeni sensus but in the poeni
damni, expanding the latter beyond the loss of the beatific vision to inelude also the loss of being that separation from God is taken to entail.
On this suggestion, our freedom extends farther than was traditionally
supposed, and the decisive decision for or against God that results
in heaven or hell includes w ithin it a decision for or against our very
existence. This destructive hell w ould be a harsher hell, for it robs us
progressively of that existence w hich is a good, but its harshness stems
from and is justified by a larger scope for our free choice.31

ANNIHILATIONISMS
So far I have tried to suggest a conception of hell attractive to those who
w ant to hold onto the traditional doctrine of everlasting suffering and
who give weight to traditional authorities like Gregory and Augustine
and to traditional Christian philosophical positions like the privative
view of evil. This conception is a sort of progressive annihilationism; but
there are also Christians who deny aspects of the traditional position and
defend a strict annihilationism, holding that the dam ned cease to exist
altogether in the post-judgment state.
31.
Eleonore Stump argues that som e such compensatory justification is needed to justify
the destruction of the dam ned precisely because destruction is an additional evil added to
our punishm ent. "Dante's Hell, Aquinas's Moral Theory, and the Love of God," Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1986): 181-98.
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Here something m ust be said about time. I have spoken of hell as if
it were a continuation of time, even citing Thomas on the point, but that
m ay just be an approximation: hell is a m irror of heaven, in some respects
duplicating and in some respects contradicting it, and its timepieces too
are reverse images of their celestial counterparts. The similarity is implied
in M atthew 25:46, where the eternity of the one is m atched to the eternity
of the other: "And they will go away into eternal punishm ent, but the
righteous into eternal life."32 Of course, these cannot be the exact same
sort of eternity, for the eternity of the life of the blessed is traditionally
taken to come by participation in G od's eternity, and not so the wicked:
the eternity of their punishm ent m ust come instead from being cut off and
unrem em bered by the Lord. This is w hy Thomas, in the passage quoted
above, takes hell to be a sort of extended temporality, reading its eternality as everlastingness.
But this is not the only way to understand the progression of progrèssive annihilation. Hans Urs von Balthasar writes,
In this context w e are only concerned w ith the different kinds of tim eless
duration, w hich can becom e m utually opposed depending on whether
there is a participation in, or a depriving of, divine eternity. The man
who, in God, contemplates him is participating in a m ode of being that
"includes all time w ithin it" (aetemitas includit om ne tempus). If he is
excluded from the contemplation of God and from a participation in the
D ivine Being, he is also excluded from this includit and so is restricted to
the tim elessness of his ow n being, deprived of all contact w ith God and
w ith his fellow creatures. Such a restricted being is stripped of all those
"dimensions" that characterize the living and that God possesses in an
infinite degree: it is thus a dead nunc stows.33

The annihilationist dissatisfied w ith the scholastic picture m ight take the
eternity of hell in this way: not as eternity in its proper sense, of the single
"now" in which God views all of creation; nor as the sort of everlastingness that suggests infinite future time, like ours in all but its endlessness;
nor even as eternity in its participated sense, the aeviternity of the medievals, a m ean betw een God and temporality; but rather as a sort of subternity, a falling away from God and the created time that is in God.34This
is not straightforw ardly describable, but if we m ust characterize it, we
m ight say that it is a sort of frozen moment, the final moment, an activity
w ithout succession. It has neither before-and-after nor does it come to an

32. For more on the exegetical debate, see below.
33. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 5 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998),
306-7.
34. The m edieval idea of aeviternity is m otivated by the notion that tim e itself, as part of
creation, is som ehow elevated or drawn closer to God in the n ew creation. Sub-ternity is the
inverse of that.
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end. It is everlasting, if pictured temporally, or instantaneous, if pictured
as the end of time, and the two held together by a chimera of gerund and
progressive participle: for the dam ned, it is a dying, an eternal moment of
death. They will be as Dante in the final, frozen ring of hell, who "did not
die, and did not rem ain alive."35
W hat this is not is pure nonexistence. The dam ned are dying: they
have not died, nor are they yet to die. Theirs is the m om ent of death,
falling timelessly from G od's sustaining presence, as the old King James
Version of the angelic oath is fulfilled: that there should be time no longer
{oti chronos ouketi estai). For the annihilationist to rem ain in continuity
w ith historical orthodoxy, he need only affirm that there is no point at
w hich the dam ned are no more, that, to adapt a phrase from the Arian
controversies, there will be no tim e at w hich they are not. God does not
judge, and kill (or let die), and contem plate the corpses; God judges the
dam ned, and kills them , and contem plates their dying. This is w here the
strict annihilationist dem urs, bu t she need not dem ur to rem ain true to
her annihilationist instincts: she can affirm the death of the dam ned, so
long as it is death everlasting. She need only say w ith the Psalmist that
though the wicked sprout like grass and all evildoers flourish, they are doomed
to destruction for ever.

A progressive annihilation need not adopt this progressive participle
approach; it can insist upon a consistent—the ultimate just like the immediate—temporality; it can take infernal eternity as infernal everlastingness instead of sub-temity; it need not make von Balthasar's turn, but
it can do so. How to understand the tem porality of progression is left
open by the mere claim that destruction is progressive. Successive loss of
our capacities suggests how suffering m ight be both eternal and finite: a
loss that is not successive and everlasting but sub-ternally instantaneous
should a fortiori be able to accommodate the same combination. The first
suggests an infinite addition of moments whose overall sum is finite;
the second suggests a finitude, because a singularity, of moments. But
I w ould suggest that the latter option is closer to w hat annihilationists
w ant in their annihilation. There is at least this difference: to say that we
are constantly dying in the sense of successively losing our capacities is to
suggest that we never really die; to say that we are frozen in a moment of
death suggests that we do die, but there is no m om ent beyond it. In that
sense, the second death is more nearly like the first: not just the erosion
of capacities, which after all happens in this life and is not properly called
death, but some sort of passing from existence.36
35. Inferno, Canto XXXIII.25 (Carlyle translation).
36. In the first death it is the body-soul union that passes from existence; for som e, at least,
this is sufficient to say that "I" pass from existence. Here it is body and soul and union that
pass away, though again, unlike the first death and pace strict annihilationism, there is no
m om ent of "having passed from existence."
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This is to allude to the exegetical grounds of annihilationism, and
here something m ust be said about Scripture, whose interpretation is at
the center of the debate betw een annihilationists and traditionalists. It is
beyond my purposes to survey and settle that exegetical debate, but three
points m ight prove helpful in laying a biblical ground for the suggestions
that have so far been advanced.
First, exegetical answers are constrained by the perceived philosophical options. The exegete takes it as her task to bring the figures and contradictions of Scripture to something nearer a univocal, propositional
statement—there is a hell of such-and-such a character—and the sorts
of propositions deemed sufficiently stable and pellucid for this task will
depend on philosophical explication. Second, the New Testament, which
is m ore explicit about the afterlife than the Old, uses language suggesting both destruction and eternality.37 Sometimes the two are joined, as
in 2 Thessalonians 1:9: "They shall suffer the punishm ent of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord." A nd while some
of this language can easily be read to imply a one-off act w ith eternal
consequences, as with the term "eternal judgm ent"38 or indeed "eternal
destruction," there are also cases where the instrum ent of punishm ent is
itself described as eternal—eternal fire,39 or the w orm that does not die
and the fire that is not quenched40—and the eternal-consequences reading
is rather more strained.
Third and consequently, the exegetical w ork tends to degenerate
quickly into ambivalence over w hether to prioritize eternality or destruction.41 As Joseph Leckie observed some years ago, "We become
involved in a debate about the m eaning of a few am biguous w ords and
of two or three pictorial expressions. We are constrained to balance very
little evidence on the one side against very little on the other."42 Because
the philosophical options are seen as either eternal punishm ent on the
one hand or destruction and subsequent nonexistence on the other, the
exegete is torn betw een the biblical language that suggests the first and
the biblical language that suggests the second, and the impossibility of

37. See, e.g., on the annihilationist side, E. Earle Ellis, Christ and the Future in New Testament History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 190-95, esp. 193; and on the traditionalist, Christopher W.
Morgan, "Biblical Theology: Three Pictures of Hell," Hell under Fire (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 142-48.
38. Heb 6:2.
39. E.g., Jude 7.
40. Mark 9:48. Christ is there quoting Isa 66:24.
41. The exegetes are not alw ays tentative, but their confidence flies in the face of Scripture's ambivalence. For a com prehensive survey of the N ew Testament evidence that brings
out this ambivalence, w ith a cautiously annihilationist conclusion, see David J. Powys,
“Hell": A Hard Look at a Hard Question; The Fate of the Unrighteous in New Testament Thought
(Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 1998), esp. chs. 7-11.
42. The World to Come and Final Destiny (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1922), 111.
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reconciling the two in a straightforw ard w ay is grounded not in scriptural but in philosophical testimony.
But w hat if the philosophical barrier is illusory, the hallucinations of a
vain desire for an afterlife that can be m odeled neatly in our minds, and
thence in our words? W hat if exegesis tem pers its conclusions not with
uncertainty but—w hat is not at all the same thing—w ith apophasis? It
is not clear w hat sub-temal existence actually means, nor how it m ight
incorporate activity, frozen or otherwise, nor how a binary transition like
dissolution, moving from a m om ent of existence to a m om ent of nonexistence, can itself be characterized as a moment to be frozen forever. Some
of this confusion is just uncertainty, an invitation to further reflection
based on a more substantial metaphysics of time, for instance. But some
of our discomfort springs from the suspicion that these questions will
never yield clear answers. This is precisely w hy Gregory's thought is a
useful foundation, not just because it is persistently apophatic—before
this darkling light there was his "lum inous darkness"43—but also because
his eschatology rem inds us in the West that the broader tradition equivocates over those future states that eye has not seen and ear has not heard.
We should like to dem and of the dam ned—as indeed of the blessed—that
they be either w ithin time or without, as those are conditions of which
we can roughly conceive. But Gregory suggests another way: perhaps
the best we can do is say that they are neither tem poral nor eternal and
construct safeguards against those who w ould incline to one affirmation
or the other. Perhaps the way forw ard constructively is to conjoin two inadequate and contradictory conceptions, each the other's implicit denial,
as w ith talk of activity w ithout succession. For in so doing we produce
a third conception, not describable in the way that the first two are, indeed only describable by something like this impossible conjunction, but
emerging nonetheless. W hat I have tried to suggest here (and this is the
second reason I find a specifically progressive annihilationism attractive)
is that there is a kind of traditionalist position that can do justice to both
sides of the scriptural ambivalence—not by speaking tentatively, which
is caution, nor by refraining from speech, which is agnosticism, but by
speaking in diverse and scarcely reconcilable ways, which is paradox
pointing tow ard apophasis.
It is a traditionalist position: I do not pretend that it is the exact position of Augustine or the medievals, say; it is not w hat those who talked of
perpetual suffering in the tradition really meant. But it accommodates traditional insights with less of the artful dodging of those, like Griffiths, who
try to read a strict annihilationism into line with historical orthodoxy. Even
if what has been suggested here is not the exact conception of someone like
Thomas, it has certain commendable features that his position lacked—not
43. Life of Moses, 95 [par. 163].
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least a harm ony with those other aspects of orthodox thought that have
generated the annihilationists' discontent. In that way, it is a challenge to
the more traditional position, asking, why not annihilationism? In another,
stronger way, it asks the balder artnihilationists, why not traditionalism?
W hat justifies continued dissent from the mass of Christians' interpretation
of Scripture on this point?44Why not a death that descends away from God,
or a dying beyond successive time? Or as Augustine puts it, if not in quite
the way Augustine means it, why not a state in which we "will not be before or after death, but always in death; and thus never living, never dead,
but endlessly dying?"45 Finally, perhaps, the blackest mark against this
view is that it does not make perfect sense; but its greatest recommendation is that, in following Scripture over the edge of hum an reason, it is not
supposed to. As Augustine also says of hell, "It cannot be concluded that a
thing has not been or shall not be because it cannot be reconciled to reason.
. . . So those things we speak of are not impossible because inexplicable."46

44. Some root their support for annihilation in the idea that God's majesty w ou ld be
offended by the continued disobedience of those in hell (see, e.g., Clark Pinnock, "The
Conditional View," in Four Views on Hell, ed. William Crockett [Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1996], 154-55.) Interestingly, Thomas argues for the preservation of the dam ned on similar,
and similarly vague, grounds: "Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the
m anifestation of grace, since rather the pow er and goodness of God are m anifested by the
preservation of things in being" (ST I. 104.4 corpus). Whether annihilation or preservation
more befits G od's nature is hard to determine: as Griffiths says, "Judgments about what
does and w hat does not lack convenientia are notoriously difficult to assess" (Griffiths, "SelfAnnihilation or Damnation?" 109). Brown and W alls argue that the extinction of the damned
is not needed to protect divine majesty, see Brown and Walls, "Annihilationism," 61-63.
45. City of God, XIII.ll.
46. City of God, XXI.5.

